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II. MUSIC
A. Copyright
1. Jukebox Copyright Royalty Fee Held Lawful and
Reasonable
A coin dropped into a jukebox to play Barbara Streisand singing
"Memories" more than likely conjurs up strong memories in the minds
of jukebox operators. The memories are of the time when they could
operate their jukeboxes free of royalty payments. Under an express
exemption in the 1909 Copyright Act jukebox proceeds were exempt
from royalty payments. The jukebox exemption, however, met its de-
mise with the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act. The subject of roy-
alty payments by jukebox operators was at issue in the recent case of
Amusement and Music Operators Association v., Copyright Royalty Tri-
bunal' (hereinafter "'Music Operators Association"). The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Copyright Royalty Tribunal
did not act unlawfully or unreasonably by establishing a $50.00 per
year royalty fee which would be implemented in stages and subject to
future adjustments.2
The proceedings at issue arose under the Copyright Revision Act
of 1976 (hereinafter "the Act").3 Under the Act operators of "coin op-
erated phonorecord players" (jukeboxes) are required to secure a com-
pulsory license for the public performance of records purchased for use
in these jukeboxes.4 Section 116 of the Act requires operators to de-
posit a royalty fee of $8.00 per year for each jukebox used. 5 The Copy-
right Royalty Tribunal (hereinafter "the Tribunal") was established by
the Act as the agency to determine and adjust copyright royalty rates.
The Tribunal was directed to commence proceedings in January, 1980,
to determine whether the $8.00 fee should be adjusted.6
Four organizations responded to the commencement of the pro-
ceedings. The jukebox operators were represented by the Amusement
and Music Operators Association, while the copyright owners were rep-
resented by three performing rights societies: the American Society of
1. 676 F.2d 1144, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 210 (1982).
2. Id. at 1159.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101-810.
4. Applications for such licenses must be filed with the Copyright Office within one
month since the jukebox began the operation for which its operator seeks the license. 676
F.2d at 1146.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (b)(1).
6. 676 F.2d at 1147.
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Composers, Authors and Publishers, Broadcast Music, Inc., and SE-
SAC, Inc. On December, 10, 1980, the Tribunal's final rule was pub-
lished, along with the relevant facts and the specific reasons for its
conclusion.
The Tribunal's most significant rulings concerned the burden of
proof, the structure of rates allowed by the Act, and the necessity for
calculating rates of return. The jukebox operators argued that the bur-
den to justify any increase in the $8.00 fee rested on the copyright own-
ers. The Tribunal, however, reasoned that none of the parties had the
burden of proof in the initial proceeding since new fee determinations
were only to be made once every decade upon the petition of interested
parties.'
The jukebox operators also argued that the Tribunal lacked the
authority to create a reate structure that would allow automatic adjust-
ments during the term of the proposed rate' to reflect the impact of
inflation on the real value of the fee. The Tribunal rejected this con-
tention, and held that nothing in the Act or its legislative history indi-
cated an intent to proscribe the application of annual cost of living
adjustments to the royalty fee.9
Finally, the Tribunal also rejected the argument that it was re-
quired to calculate individual compensation to copyright owners. It
found that reliance on a collective rate of return to the copyright own-
ers as a group was proper.' ° Section 116 of the Act specifically pro-
vides that the royalty fees are to be disbursed to the performing arts
organizations. "
In its order of January 5, 1981, the Tribunal determined that the
royalties payable by jukebox operators to the owners of copyrighted
music should be set at a level of $50.00 per jukebox per year.'2 The key
considerations in the Tribunal's analysis were the four statutory criteria
(objectives) set out in the Act.' 3 Based on these criteria the Tribunal
7. 17 U.S.C. § 804(a)(1).
8. The term of the proposed rate refers to the option to to undertake a new rulemaking
in each subsequent tenth calendar year, as authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 804 (a)(l).
9. 676 F.2d at 1148.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Tribunal determined that the legislative history of the Act did not indicate
an intent for the Tribunal to regulate the internal operations of the performing arts societies.
12. $25.00 per year in 1982 and 1983, and $50.00 per year thereafter.
13. A) to maximize the availability of creative works to the public; B) to afford the
copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the copyright user a fair income
under existing economic conditions; C) to reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner
and the copyright user in the product made available to the public with respect to relative
creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contri-
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concluded that its final rate decision adequately reflected concern for
the impact on all the parties involved.'
4
The threshold issue for the court of appeals was a determination of
the appropriate standard of review of a decision by the Tribunal. 5 The
Tribunal argued that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard was
proper in this case. The jukebox operators, however, argued that the
"substantial evidence" test was required. The court stressed that the
difference between the two standards was largely semantic, and that the
primary concern was whether the Tribunal had given reasoned consid-
eration to each of the pertinent factors involved in its decision.' 6 In
essence, the court felt that the basic requirement was that there be sup-
port in the record for what was done.'7 Moreover, the court cited a
recent decision by the District of Columbia circuit where, in an analo-
gous setting, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard was used to re-
view a royalty fee established by the Tribunal.' 8 In sum, the court
stated that since the distinction between the two tests was without prac-
tical significance, a careful full-scope review would be pursued in both
instances. '9
On appeal, the jukebox operators attempted to demonstrate the
depressed economic condition of the jukebox business.2" Citing evi-
dence of the decline in the jukebox operating business the operators
argued that the $8.00 fee set by Congress should remain unchanged.2'
Additionally, they argued that the copyright owners had the burden of
establishing the necessity for an increase in the fee, and that no statu-
tory basis existed for the inflation adjustments. 22 Essentially, their ar-
gument is that the Tribunal erred by increasing the royalty fee when
the evidence suggested that to do so may cause some jukeboxes to be-
come unprofitable.
The court concluded that the legislative history of the Act clearly
bution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communi-
cation; D) to minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and
on generally prevailing industry practices. 17 U.S.C. § 801.
14. 676 F.2d at 1149.
15. Id Jurisdiction to review a decision of the Tribunal is based on 17 U.S.C. § 801.
16. Id. at 1150-51.
17. Id. at 1151.
18. Recording Industry Association of America v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d
1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. 676 F.2d at 1152.
20. Id. Eighteen percent of the jukeboxes in operation earned less than $300.00 per year,
while 47% earned less than $700.00 per year.
21. 676 F.2d at 1152.
22. Id at 1152.
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refuted these contentions. Relying on the record of House and Senate
Committee Reports23 the court noted that the original $8.00 fee was
reached as a political compromise, and that there is nothing in the re-
ports to indicate that Congress felt the fee would be reasonable for the
1980'S.24 "The procedures established by the Act for determining and
implementing the royalty fee underscore this conclusion. Section
804(a) of the Act directs the Tribunal to institute proceedings to adjust
the jukebox fees set in section 116 in order to determine a reasonable
fee under the criteria of section 801(b)(1)."25 Therefore, because Con-
gress directed the Tribunal to assess the propriety of an $8.00 fee in
1980, the court agreed with the Tribunal's conclusion that no special
imprimatur is attached to the original fee.26
The court also rejected the argument that the burden was on the
copyright owners to prove the necessity for a fee increase. This conclu-
sion was based on the statutory scheme itself, which makes it clear that
neither side is the proponent.27 Subsequent to the establishment of a
reasonable fee, the Tribunal is directed to assess the amount only upon
the petition of a party with a significant interest.28 Thus, this statutory
directive is an exception to the usual practice that the proponent of a
rule of order has the burden of proof.
29
Moreover, the court concluded that the jukebox operators have
failed to demonstrate that the Tribunal acted arbitrarily or capriciously
when it established a $50.00 royalty fee. At the heart of the jukebox
operators' case was a survey documenting the overall plight of the juke-
box industry.3" The court agreed with the Tribunal that this survey
should be accorded little weight since the response rate on its question-
naire to jukebox operators was low.3 Without this evidence the juke-
box operators were left with little to support their allegation concerning
current profitability of the industry. On the other hand, the court be-
lieved that the copyright owners presented the most credible and relia-
ble evidence, and that the Tribunal did not act arbitrarily in
23. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 113, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5728, 5729; S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97.
24. 676 F.2d at 1153.
25. Id at 1154.
26. Id. at 1154.
27. Id. at 1154.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 804 (a)(2)(C).
29. 676 F.2d at 1154.
30. The survey indicated that any increase in the royalty fee would probably force some
small operators out of business.
31. Approximately 14% of the responses were from jukebox operators.
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considering this information. 32  Thus, the court concluded that the
$50.00 fee was fully justified by the record as a whole.3 3
The Tribunal is endowed with plenary power to establish and ad-
just royalty rates in various segments of the entertainment industry. It
is composed of five commissioners appointed by the President for seven
year terms. The Tribunal is directed to accompany its final decisions
with a statement of the facts it found relevant, the criteria it used, and
the specific reasons for its conclusion.34 Rulings of the Tribunal are not
subject to legislative veto. Rather, judicial review was established as
the method to assess the body's decisions. It was thought that this
method would insure a more detailed and careful review of possible
arbitrary or capricious determinations.35
The result in this case is significant because it underscores and af-
firms the power of the Tribunal. The court noted in its conclusion that
ratemaking is an art, not a science. 36 Impliedly, the court was an-
nouncing that it will defer to the Tribunal's decisions as long as they
appear reasonable and in conformity with the statutory criteria. Simi-
lar statements were made in Recording Industry Association v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal.37 In that case the court noted that the Tribunal's
decision was based on a reasonable interpretation of statutory lan-
guage, and was entitled to deference. These statements indicate that
the Tribunal has considerable discretion in charting royalty policy.
The scope of the Tribunal's power is likely to become an impor-
tant issue in the near future due to the rapid growth of the cable indus-
try. In a recent cases, where rate structures for roylaty fees paid by
cable operators were at issue, the Tribunal was accorded more than the
usual deference. 38 The court stated that the Tribunal must announce
the basis for its decision, but noted that in this case, the body was not
always explicit when it rejected proffered evidence.39 The court did not
sanction the lapses, but decided to regard them "charitibly" in light of
the Tribunal's lack of professional staff and the novelty of the proceed-
ing. The court's apparent justification for this was that it expected the
quality of the Tribunal's decisionmaking to improve with experience.'
32. The evidence consisted mostly of market analogies.
33. 676 F.2d at 1157.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 803.
35. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1976).
36. 676 F.2d at 1159.
37. 662 F.2d 1 (1981).
38. National Cable TV v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir 1982).
39. Id at 1091.
40. Id.
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This type of language raises serious questions as to the scope of the
Tribunal's power in the future. Namely, how will it be known that the
Tribunal has become sufficiently experienced so that its "lapses" are no
longer excusable? Future decisions must answer that question.
In the meantime, these recent decisions which accord strong defer-
ence to the Tribunal are just. As the courts have recognized, the Tribu-
nal is still a relatively new body, and its decisionmaking will likely
become more insightful and consistent as it achieves a greater working
knowledge of the various segments of the entertainment industry.
Randy Berg
B. Breach of Contract
1. Personal Service Contracts
It is a longstanding rule that courts of equity will not order specific
performance of personal service contracts.' In a decision applying this
rule to bankruptcy-proceedings, In re Noonan,2 the court stated that
services performed under a personal service contract were for the per-
sonal benefit of the debtor rather than for the benefit of the estate and
that a contract of such nature was not an asset that could be used for
the estate's benefit or in the debtor's plan of reorganization absent his
consent.3
In 1978, Robert Noonan, a songwriter known professionally as
Willie Niles, entered into an eighteen month exclusive recording con-
tract with Arista Records.' Under this contract, Noonan was obligated
to record at least two albums and Arista had the option to extend the
contract for three more consecutive eighteen month periods.-
Arista paid the production costs for the two albums.6 Although
Noonan was not personally liable for these costs, Arista was entitled to
recoup the money from royalties from the sales of the albums. 7 How-
ever, the albums were not a commercial success and the resulting royal-
ties failed to cover the production costs.8 Nevertheless, Arista decided
1. Arkansas Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379 (1888); 5A Corbin, Con-
tracts § 1204 (1964).
2. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 68,841 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 1982); Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Holahan, 311 F. 2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1962).
3. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 81,291.
4. Id at 81,289.
5. Id
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id
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to hold Noonan to a second eighteen month term. 9
Dissatisfied with his contract, Noonan, in 1981, filed a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter Eleven' of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act." As a debtor in possession, 2 Noonan moved for an order re-
jecting the Arista contract as executory. 13 When Arista contested this
motion, Noonan successfully converted his case to Chapter Seven.'
4
This conversion provided for an automatic rejection of executory con-
tracts as Noonan could not be forced to perform.' 5 However, Arista
moved to put Noonan back into Chapter Eleven.'
6
The court denied Arista's motion since the recording contract was
for debtor's services and could not be assigned or assumed by Noonan's
Bankruptcy Trustee.' 7 The court held that Chapter Eleven did not ap-
ply as Noonan had no tangible assets to distribute in a business reor-
ganization.' 8 Noonan's contract was for personal services and
9. 1d
10. II U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. IV 1980).
II. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 81,289.
12. 11 U.S.C. § l101(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
13. A right given by II U.S.C. § 365 (West 1979), to trustees and to Chapter Eleven
debtors in possession by the force of I I U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. IV 1980). [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 81,289.
14. I1 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (Supp. IV 1980). [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 81,289.
15. Noonan's application acknowledged that the reason for the conversion was to take
advantage of the automatic rejection of executory contracts given by I I U.S.C. § 365 (c) and
(d)(1) (West 1979). The section reads as follows:
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties if:
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract
or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the
trustee or assignee of such contract or lease, whether or not such contract or
lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and,
(B) such party does not consent to such assignment or assumption ...
(d)(I) In a case under Chapter Seven of this title, if the trustee does not assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days
after the order for relief, or within such additional time, as the court, for
cause, within such 60 day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is
deemed rejected.
However, the application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) is limited to executory contracts which
are truly personal. 16 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 706(b) (West 1979); [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 81,289.
17. Where an executory contract between the debtor and another is of such a nature as
to be based upon the debtor's personal skill, the trustee does not take title to the debtor's
rights and cannot deal with the contract. Villar & Co. v. Conde, 30 F. 2d 588 (1st Cir. 1929);
D.H. McBride, 132 F. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1904); 4A Collier, Bankruptcy 70.22(3) (14th ed.
1983); [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 81,291.
18. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 81,291.
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therefore could never be part of an estate.I9 While sympathizing with
Arista, the court decided that Noonan's interests outweighed Arista's.2 °
To force Noonan to comply with the contract would be equivalent to
involuntary servitude, a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment."'
This case has minimal impact in the entertainment industry as the
court is merely following a well established rule that they will not en-
force personal service contracts by specific performance. However, the
court does expand the application of this rule to bankruptcy proceed-
ings under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Nevertheless, this is a narrow'
decision as Noonan had to satisfy the requirements to declare bank-
ruptcy under Chapters Seven and Eleven, to escape his contract with-
out any penalties. Perhaps, the only effect it will have in the
entertainment industry is that the industry will investigate the finances
of the other party more thouroughly before signing them to a personal
service contract.
Grisel Feldfeber
2. Explicit Drafting in Royalty Contracts
In the entertainment industry, the term "royalty" does not com-
monly identify a king, queen, or other person of royal lineage; rather, it
is the share paid to an artist out of the proceeds resulting from the sale
or performance of his work.' Tied to such proceeds, the potential value
of a royalty is often unknown; what presently may be an interest in a
work of no acclaim may tomorrow become an interest in one of the
industry's big hits. So you never really know what you have until you
begin to get it, which is one good reason why contracts for interests in
19. Id.
20. Id
21. The court stated that Arista should have known, from earlier decisions, that this
contract would not be enforced by specific performance. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 81,291.
In ABC v. Wolf, 52 N.Y. 2d 394 (1981), ABC sought specific performance of a sports-
caster's contract. The court refused, stating that the court would have difficulty supervising
such performance and to require such performance would be equivalent to involuntary ser-
vitude.
In In re Zotti, 16 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981), the personal service nature of a
contract between debtor and creditor, which primarily concerned the personal services of
debtor to be rendered in sale of insurance and the recruitment and training of subagents
together with a terminable at will provision in the contract, was determined to be unassum-
able on objection by the creditor; [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at
81,292.
1. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969, 1970).
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certain royalties should be as explicit as possible, readying the parties
for whatever eventualities might arise.
This is a lesson to be learned from the case of In Re Miller,2 in
which the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld both the trial and ap-
pellate courts' determination that an ambiguous contract granting an
interest in certain royalties terminated on a specified date, much to the
chagrin of the potential beneficiary.
In 1945, after the War Department officially declared Glen Miller
dead, David Mackay, the former orchestra leader's personal attorney
and advisor, served as attorney for Miller's estate. Sharing concern
with Miller's wife, Helen D. Miller, the sole beneficiary and executrix
of the estate, over a decline in income from RCA recording royalties,
Mackay suggested that perhaps RCA could do something with old "air
checks," the recordings of radio broadcast performances of the Glen
Miller Orchestra which Miller had used to evaluate the orchestra's per-
formances. With Mrs. Miller's approval, Mackay undertook the "mon-
umental task"3 of cataloguing and monitoring the old recordings.
RCA ultimately determined that it was feasible to make commercial
quality recordings from the old air checks.
On August 14, 1951, Helen Miller, as executrix of the Glen Miller
estate, entered into a contract with RCA dated August 8, 1951. The
contract provided that RCA would release one album a year for three
years and would pay the estate a six percent royalty on 91 1/2 percent
of all sales, to be paid semi-annually. The contract also gave RCA the
perpetual right to manufacture and release records of the selections
made under the contract.
On the same day she signed the RCA contract, Helen Miller
signed a document written by Mackay which stated that "the under-
signed hereby sells, assigns, transfers and sets over unto David Mackay
a sum equivalent to one-third of the royalties to accrue" from Mrs.
Miller's contract with RCA.4 The legal effect of this document is the
issue of the case on appeal.
The recordings released pursuant to the 1951 contract met with
greater commercial success than the parties had expected. In 1954, a
new agreement was formed which provided that the estate would turn
over to RCA all previously unreleased recordings of the Glenn Miller
Orchestra, and RCA would between 1954 and 1959 re-record and re-
lease at least 80 performances and would pay the estate six percent of
2. 90 N.J. 210, 447 A.2d 549 (1982).
3. 447 A.2d at 551.
4. Id
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90 percent of all sales. The method of payment was modified to create
a tax advantage to the estate; guaranteed payments were established
until 1959 and a reserve fund was created to cover future payments.
Significantly, the 1954 agreement did not give RCA a perpetual right to
manufacture and release air check recordings.
The 1951 document that gave Mackay a one-third interest in mon-
ies accrued under the initial contract was also supplanted in 1954. The
new agreement signed by Mrs. Miller was identical to its predecessor,
with the exception that Mackay's percentage would be computed and
paid only after the estate received the first $15,000.00 each year, the
amount it earned in royalties prior to the release of the air checks.
Due to continued commercial success, in 1955 the parties again
entered into a new contract. RCA agreed to increase the number of
guaranteed releases, the guaranteed annual payments were continued,
and the ceiling on the reserve fund was nearly doubled. Once again
Mackay requested that Mrs. Miller execute a document entitling him
to one-third of the proceeds, after the first $15,000.00 of the year, accru-
ing from the 1955 contract with RCA. This time Mrs. Miller did not
comply. Mackay wrote several letters in 1955 requesting Mrs. Miller's
compliance, and on April 15, 1958, he wrote her suggesting that her
idea of paying his one-third interest on a yearly basis rather than hav-
ing a blanket assignment related to each RCA contract would have ad-
verse tax consequences for the estate. For an unknown reason,
sometime after April 15, 1958, Mrs. Miller complied with Mackay's re-
quest and executed the document he had written. It is important to
note that throughout the time that the document remained unsigned,
Mackay continued to receive the appropriate royalty payments.
In January, 1958, RCA and Mrs. Miller amended their agreement
in response to further commercial success. The royalty rate for record
club sales was adjusted, the annual payments were extended through
1964 and their minimum increased, and the reserve fund ceiling was
similarly increased. "Mrs. Miller executed a document giving Mackay
a right to one-third of the proceeds of the January, 1958 amendment to
the 1955 RCA contract."5
Further amendments to the RCA contract were made in 1960,
1962, and 1963. The annual minimum payments were ultimately ex-
tended through 1967 and the reserve fund ceiling was altered in the
1960 and 1962 amendments. In reference to the payments to Mackay
under the 1960 amendment, Mrs. Miller signed a document which dif-
5. Id at 552.
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fered from the previous documents in that it stated that Mackay was to
receive one-third of the proceeds under the 1955 RCA contract "and
any amendments thereof."'6 Apparently this clause would obviate the
need for similar documents in the future.
Mackay continued to collect one-third of the royalties up to and
through the time of Helen Miller's death on June 2, 1966. The Miller
estate was left to the two children, Steven Miller and Jonnie Soper,
and Mackay was named its executor. In letters dated June 20, 1968,
Mackay wrote to Miller and Soper explaining his arrangements with
the estate and suggesting certain modifications in the terms of payment.
Both Miller and Soper agreed to the proposal and Mackay continued to
receive one-third of the royalties thereafter.
Sometime in 1975, after Miller and Soper had a falling out with
Mackay, they began an investigation into the attorney's dealings with
the estate. They eventually brought an action for an accounting and
against Mackay for monies they alleged he wrongfully took. The sole
issue presented before the Supreme Court of New Jersey concerned the
legal effect of the documents granting Mackay one-third of the royal-
ties; none of the documents mentioned how long he would continue to
collect that amount. The precise issue is whether there was sufficient
credible evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the docu-
ments executed by Mrs. Miller did not entitle Mackay to receive one-
third of the royalties after March 15, 1967, the date upon which the
guaranteed annual payments would cease.7
The majority reasoned that to resolve the ambiguity as to the dura-
tion of Mackay's interest, the trial court was forced to examine the in-
tent of the parties in the context of pertinent established legal
principles.
Firstly, it was asserted that "[plerpetual contract performance is
not favored in the law and is to be avoided unless there is a clear mani-
festation that the parties intended it."8 The court, under the impression
that the words of the documents themselves signified no such intent,
6. Id
7.
The trial court held that in agreeing to the terms as stated by Mackay in the June
20, 1968 letter, respondents [Miller and Soper] agreed to allow Mackay to continue
to receive a third of the RCA royalties. The court determined, however, that this
agreement was procured as the result of Mackay's undue influence over respon-
dents and was therefore void.
Id at 553. n.2.
8. Id. at 554 (citing West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 29, 138 A.2d 402 (1958);
Koch v. Koch, 95 N.J. Super. 546, 550, 232 A.2d 157 (App. Div. 1967); 1 Williston on Con-
tracts § 38 (3d ed. 1957); 3 Corbin, Contracts § 553 (1960)).
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turned to the parties' conduct and concluded that their actions would
indicate the opposite: if, as Mackay argues, the original transfer gave
an interest in royalties as long as they accrued, it would not have been
necessary to amend those transfers each time the payment schedule was
changed; similarly, Mrs. Miller's suggestion that Mackay be paid yearly
was considered a strong indication that she never intended the interest
to be perpetual.9 The court felt there was sufficient support for the trial
court's finding that Mrs. Miller did not intend to give Mackay an inter-
est in the royalties as long as they continued to accrue."
The court then turned to an analysis of the trial court's conclusion
that the interest in royalties ran only as long as the guaranteed pay-
ments in the underlying RCA contract continued (March 15, 1967).
The court reasoned that if a contract contains no express term as to its
duration, it is terminable at will or after a reasonable time. " Consider-
ing the effort expended by Mackay and the returns he received up until
March 15, 1967,2 that date was viewed as a reasonable termination
date.
The court felt, however, that once again the trial court was forced
to analyze the conduct of the parties and, if a definite period of time
could be inferred from that conduct in light of surrounding circum-
stances, then that time period should govern. 13 The court found sup-
port for the March 15, 1967 termination date: the execution of new
documents each time the payment schedule was modified, inferring
that the interest lasted only as long as the payment schedule was in
effect; Mrs. Miller's attempt to put Mackay's interest on a year-to year
basis; and, most importantly, there is what the parties believed would
be the revenue from the RCA contract-considering that Mackay in
his accounting of the estate dated September 10, 1970, stated that it was
anticipated that the income from the RCA contract would eventually
dwindle to nothing, it would seem likely that Mrs. Miller understood
the March 15, 1967 date to be the probable date of that expiration.' 4
Looking to the writings themselves, the court reasoned that
"[w]here an ambiguity appears in a written agreement, the writing is to
be strictly construed against the draftsman."' 5 Since Mackay drafted
9. 447 A.2d at 554.
10. Id (citation omitted).
11. Id. (citing Esslinger's v. Alachnowitz, 68 N.J. Super. 339, 172 A.2d 433 (App. Div.
1961)). See 1 Williston on Contracts § 38 (1957); 1 Corbin, Contracts § 96 (1967).
12. Mackay received more than $400,000.00 between 1952 and 1967. 447 A.2d at 554.
13. Id.
14. Id at 554-55.
15. Id at 555 (citing Terminal Construction Corp. v. Bergen County, 18 N.J. 294, 302,
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the documents, his failure to ensure the duration of his royalties as he
alleged it to be must be construed against him.
Similarly, the court reasoned that the use of the words "sell, as-
sign, transfer and set over" did not suffice to convey a permanent inter-
est in the royalties. 6
The majority opinion was met with a very strong dissent, one
which varied in the interpretation of the facts and the application of
contract law. Preliminarily, the dissent argued that the majority over-
stated the ambiguity of the documents and also ignored the principle
that the words of a contract are a primary indicator of the parties' in-
tent.'7 Thus, the dissent inquired whether reasonable persons would
agree on what the words of the contract meant, and what words reason-
able people would have used if they intended a particular result.
The dissent concluded that the words "sell, transfer and set over"
conveyed a permanent interest in the royalties.'" In addition, they felt
that the majority and the trial court misapplied the doctrine that courts
frown upon the imposition of perpetual contractual performance; Mac-
kay was being compensated for past services in preparing the air checks
for presentation to RCA, not for any continuing service.' 9 The pre-
sumption against perpetual contractual performance was considered
inapplicable for another reason: the contract was not viewed as one in
perpetuity since the estate's obligation to Mackay would cease once
RCA stopped selling records and paying royalties to the estate.2°
113 A.2d 787 (1955)). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981): "[i]n choosing
among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning
is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from
whom a writing otherwise proceeds."
16. 447 A.2d at 555. The court disagreed with the dissent's reasoning that the case of
Hirsh v. Phily, 4 N.J. 408, 73 A.2d 173 (1950), supported that proposition. In Hirsch, the
words "sell, transfer and set over" were accompanied by other words which were crucial in
signifying an intent to convey a permanent interest ("to receive all moneys [sic] due or to
grow due thereon.") 4 N.J. at 413-14.
17. 447 A.2d at 560 (citing Hirsch, 4 N.J. at 413).
18. See supra note 16. The dissent repeatedly asserts that the term "sale" does not com-
monly connote a temporary arrangement. 447 A.2d at 561.
19. Id at 561-62. The dissent distinguished the cases cited by the majority. West Cald-
well v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 138 A.2d 402 (1958), as a case involving a contract for continuing
services, differs from the Miller case, which involves compensation for past services. Koch v.
Koch, 95 N.J. Super. 546, 232 A.2d 157 (App. Div. 1967), as a case involving the duty of
performing services, differs from the Miller case, which solely involves the duty to pay
money.
20. 447 A.2d at 563. The dissent cited Lura v. Multaplex, 129 Cal. App. 3d 410, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 847 (1982), in support of this proposition. In Lura, defendant promised to pay plaintiff
a commission on each of the accounts which plaintiff had procured for defendant. Though
the contract did not include a term specifying how long the commissions would be paid, the
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The dissent grappled further with the majority's interpretation of
the parties' conduct and the inferences that could be drawn therefrom.
The most significant disparity in the judgments, however, concerns the
approaches taken towards resolving the apparent ambiguity in the doc-
uments. The majority searches for the intent of the parties as revealed
in their conduct; the dissent, on the other hand, turns to the parties'
conduct only insofar as it related to the reasonable interpretation of the
documents themselves. Where one scrutinizes conduct to lend meaning
to words, the other reviews conduct to support the reasonable interpre-
tation of those words.
These very disparate approaches are an integral part of the law of
contract interpretation.2' Yet, the case of In Re Miller does not serve
the entertainment law industry best as a relevant example of the
problems of contract interpretation; rather, it best serves as a lesson in
contract draftsmanship. For all intents and purposes, Mackay may
very well have been deprived of royalty payments which Mrs. Miller
had fully intended he receive; after all, all royalties from the recordings
were essentially a product of his ingenuity. Yet, he failed to secure his
interest by drafting a "tight" instrument which comprehensively ac-
counted for whatever eventualities might arise.
An open-ended contract is a ticket to future dispute. This is espe-
cially true when dealing with the volatile royalty. As an interest which
can grow beyond expectations and can survive all probabilities, the
royalty must be well protected.
Alejandro N Mayorkas
C. Nuisance
1. Rock Concert Injunction Unconstitutional
An Ohio Court of Common Pleas held in State ex re. Pizza v. Tom
S, A. Inc.' that Ohio's attempt to abate illegal drug activity by en-
joining a rock concert on private land was an overbroad application of
Ohio's nuisance statute and violated the concert promoter's first and
fourteenth amendment rights. It also held that the concert promoter
court, reasoning that the contract was not one in perpetuity, held that the obligation to pay
commissions ran only as long as the defendant continued to benefit from the accounts the
plaintiff had secured. Analogizing that situation to the one present in the instant case, the
dissent reasoned that as long as the estate continued to benefit from Mackay's past services,
it was obligated to pay him his share of the royalties. 447 A.2d at 563.
21. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 116-125 (1977).
1. 68 Ohio Misc. 19, 428 N.E.2d 878 (1981).
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lacked culpability under Ohio's remedies statute because he had em-
ployed security guards to discourage drug violations. No appeal was
taken by Ohio.
Rock concert promoter, Tom S. A., Inc., ("Tom"), scheduled a
concert at the Toledo Speedway on August 23, 1981. Ohio prosecutor,
Anthony Pizza, applied to both temporarily and permanently enjoin
the concert on the basis that illegal drug activity had occurred at Tom's
speedway concert the previous year. The cause was heard August 10,
1981, thirteen days before the scheduled concert.
The court found for Tom on two grounds. First, it considered the
application of Ohio's nuisance statute, as a means of prohibiting an
activity which is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, to
be overbroad. Second, it found that Tom had no duty to enforce Ohio
law on private property, but, nonetheless hired security guards to dis-
courage drug violations. He therefore lacked the requisite culpability
to invoke application of Ohio's remedies statute.
In Tom, 2 the court examined how the first and fourteenth amend-
ments protect free expression. It cited Brooks v. Auburn University3 for
the proposition that the Constitution protects the right to not only
speak freely but also to hear freely.4 In Brooks the president of Au-
burn University sought to bar Reverand William Sloan Coffin, a con-
victed felon and chaplain at Yale University, from making a scheduled
appearance on campus. The president felt that Rev. Coffin advocated
lawlessness.' The appellate court in Brooks ordered that the Reverand
be allowed to speak.6
The Tom court emphasized the importance of free speech and ex-
pressed its suspicion toward government action which tended to affect
freedom of expression7 by referring to the following two cases. In
Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System8 a minor child shot and
killed an 83-year-old woman. The child's father sued CBS, NBC and
ABC television networks as parties responsible for violent program-
ming which contributed to his son's desensitization and addiction to
violent acts. The court in Zamora dismissed the claim in favor of the
networks and recognized the importance of free speech in network
2. Id
3. 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969).
4. Id at 1172.
5. Id at 1171.
6. Id
7. 428 N.E.2d at 880.
8. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.Fla. 1979).
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television.9
In Dewine v. Ohio Elections Commission, 'I when an Ohio statute
prohibiting knowingly false statements about candidates in approach-
ing elections was found not to violate the first amendment, the court
emphasized that it had closely scrutinized government action tending
to affect free speech." Thus the Tom court reasoned that statutes
which interfere with free expression should be subject to close judicial
scrutiny.
The Tom court focused on the special problem of entertainment as
an exercise of free expression, by relying on Police Department of Chi-
cago v. Mosley12 for the proposition that "the government has no
power to restrict expression because of the message, ideas, subject mat-
ter, content, popularity or social utility of the ideas and beliefs put for-
ward." ' 3 The Supreme Court in Mosley struck down an Illinois statute
which prohibited picketing within 150 feet of schools unless the picket-
ing was related to teacher employment disputes. Mosley, who picketed
a Chicago high school due to racial discrimination, asked for declara-
tory judgment on the statute. The Court held that the statute violated
the Constitution on its face because it made an "impermissible distinc-
tion between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing."' 4 Thus, the
subject matter of the communication is immaterial in the face of first
amendment rights.
The Tom court found that entertainment also enjoys protection
under the first amendment by relying on Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting.5 In Zacchini, a news man who video taped Zacchini's
entire fifteen second human-cannon-ball act, without Zacchini's per-
mission to show it on the evening news, was in violation of Zacchini's
property rights despite the news man's asserted first amendment privi-
lege. Zacchini brought suit for damages claiming that Scripps-Howard
had taken his property without due process. Zacchini asserted no first
amendment right and Scripp-Howard's first amendment argument
proved to be ineffective. While the Court stated that entertainment en-
joys first amendment protection, the statement was not central to the
holding. Consequently, the Zacchini opinion may be misplaced as pre-
9. 480 F. Supp. at 199.
10. Dewine v. Ohio Elections Commission, 61 Ohio App. 2d 25, 399 N.E.2d 99 (1978).
11. Id.
12. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
13. Id
14. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
15. 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
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cedent for the proposition that the Tom concert enjoyed first amend-
ment protection.
The Tom court also relied on Southwestern Promotions, LTD v.
West Palm Beach. I6 In Palm Beach, the city manager refused to allow
the rock musical "Hair" to be performed in the city auditorium because
he did not consider it to be "family entertainment."' 7 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the arbitrary suppression of free
expression in a public building was a violation of first amendment
rights.18 Moreover, the court of appeals held that considerations of
whether there were other suitable facilities for the event, or whether the
event was staged solely for making money, were immaterial.' 9 There-
fore, the court concluded that entertainment for profit like Tom's rock
concert "[was] entitled to protection under the right of free
expression.""
Once the Tom court determined that the concert promoter could
legitimately invoke first amendment protection, 2' the question remain-
ing was how far that protection should be extended. This was largely a
matter of judicial discretion, however there were some factors which
guided the court's decision. These factors included: (a) the extent to
which the defendant sought to incite imminent lawless action, (b) the
the importance of the state's compelling interest, and (c) the strength of
the causal nexus between the illegal act and the act which the state
sought to enjoin.
With regard to the first factor of the extent of protection, the Tom
court cited Brandenburg v. Ohio 22 for the proposition that an audience's
unlawful conduct, absent a specific intention to incite imminent lawless
action, was not sufficient justification to curtail the right of free expres-
sion." In Brandenburg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an Ohio
16. 457 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1972).
17. Id at 1017.
18. Id. at 1020.
19. Id.
20. Tom, 478 N.E.2d at 880, citing Southeastern Promotions, LTD v. Mobile, 457 F.2d
340 (5th Cir. 1972), ("Hair" rock musical permitted in Alabama); Goldstein v. Nantucket,
477 F. Supp. 606 (D. Mass. 1979) (use of Nantucket's transient street vendor ordinance to
prohibit street musicians violates first amendment); People v. Remeny, 79 Misc. 2d 160, 359
N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1974), ap'd, 83 Misc. 2d 459, 367 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App.
Div. 1975) (use of New York ordinance prohibiting leaflet advertising does not violate first
amendment when applied to jazz concert leaflets). See also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), (primarily commercial advertising not protected by first amendment).
21. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of standing.
22. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
23. Tom, 428 N.E.2d 878, at 881.
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statute prohibiting the Klu Klux Klan from organizing meetings, was
unconstitutional unless the meetings were directed toward inciting or
producing imminent lawless action.2 4 In Tom, the court found no basis
for the State's contention that the concert promoter intended to incite
illegal drug activity. In fact, the court described, at length, the pro-
moter's efforts to discourage such activity by employing cameras,
searches, and uniformed and undercover security guards. These pre-
cautions by the promoter proved to be important because the holding
was based on these precautions as evidence of the promoter's lack of
culpability in the alleged felony drug violations. The price of a com-
prehensive security system proved to be an effective defense against
Ohio's remedies statute which required a showing of culpability.
The second factor regarding the extent of protection in the Tom
decision focused on Ohio's compelling state interest to control illegal
drug activity on private land. The court pointed out that the promoter
had no duty to provide authorized personnel to enforce Ohio's drug
laws. It cited N.A.A. CP. v. Button2" for the proposition that govern-
ment restrictions on freedom of expression, in the name of a compel-
ling state interest, are overbroad unless the restrictions are the
narrowest possible. In Button, the compelling state interest was to pro-
hibit solicitations by attorneys that encouraged law suits on racial dis-
crimination. The Court in Button held that the prohibition was an
overbroad violation of first amendment rights because it was not the
narrowest possible.26 The court in Tom considered the compelling
state interest of Ohio controlling drug activity on private land by using
a nuisance statute to be less compelling than the concert promoter's
constitutional right of free expression.
In determining the relative weight of a nuisance statute as com-
pared to the promoter's right to stage a rock concert, the Tom court
relied on Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc. 27 to show that nui-
sance actions should be narrowly construed when counterposed against
free expression. In Vance, a Texas statute which temporarily prohib-
ited film exhibitors who had past records of showing obscene films,
from showing films not yet censured, was held to be invalid because it
placed restraints on the first amendment rights of the exhibitors before
any ruling had been made on the film's obscenity. Likewise, in Tom,
the State attempted to enforce one of its nuisance statutes against activ-
24. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444, at 447.
25. 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
26. Id
27. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
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ities occurring on private property based on evidence of a past record
of alleged violations. In both cases, the state was attempting to prohibit
what the Supreme Court in Vance called an "invalid prior restraint on
the exercise of first amendment rights."28 The Tom court implied that
Ohio's application for injunction was a prior restraint on Tom's exer-
cise of first amendment rights, and therefore invalid.
A third factor regarding the extent of protection which was im-
plied in Tom focused on the extent to which the illegal activities were
connected with the activity that the State sought to enjoin. The court
made a distinction between the concert and the drug activities by not-
ing that the State could not expect to completely prohibit the legitimate
exercise of free expression simply because some patrons acted ille-
gally. 9 Even when the State offered extensive evidence that felony
drug violations took place at the prior concert, the court would not
accept the argument that the concert itself caused the violations, be-
cause there was no close nexus between the illegal drug activity and the
legal concert activity which the State sought to enjoin.
The Tom case also presented the traditional problem of third party
standing, because Tom S. A. Inc., the concert promoter, sought to assert
a constitutional defense based on the first amendment rights of his pa-
trons and the artists. The court found three independent grounds for
standing based on (a) the close relationship between the defendant and
the persons whose rights he sought to invoke, (b) the fact that the con-
stitutional rights of the third persons had a direct effect on the business
rights of the defendant, and (c) the fact that the state sought to impose a
restriction on the defendant which may, in turn, have deprived the
third parties of their rights.3"
The first ground for standing was based upon the concert pro-
moter's close relationship with his patrons and the artists that were
scheduled to perform. Third party standing has been accepted by the
Supreme Court as an exception to the general rule that a third party
has no standing to raise the rights of another.3 The Sixth Circuit in
Akron Board of Education v. State Board of Education of Ohio 32 found
that an Ohio municipal school board had standing to bring an action
on behalf of parties within the municipal school district to oppose state
28. id. at 312.
29. Tom, 428 N.E.2d 878, at 881.
30. Id
31. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), (white landowner had standing to assert
rights of blacks in suit alleging invalidity of racially restrictive covenant).
32. 490 F.2d 1285 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
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reapportionment. The Sixth Circuit held there was a sufficiently "close
relationship" between the plaintiffs and the class of persons whose con-
stitutional rights were claimed to be violated.33 The Tom court held
that there was a similarly close relationship between the pro-
moter/property owner and the performers and patrons whose rights he
asserted.34
A second ground for standing was founded on the basis that the
injunction would have a direct adverse impact on the defendant's busi-
ness.35 In Pentco, Inc. v. Moody36 an Ohio district court held that the
owner of a massage parlor had standing to exercise the constitutional
rights of his customers in a suit challenging the validity of a statute
prohibiting such parlors. The owner's standing was valid because a
violation of the constitutional rights of the customers would have a di-
rect adverse impact on the defendant's business.37 The Tom court
found that the promoter, would have suffered a similar direct adverse
impact on his business had the constitutional rights of his customers
been violated.
The third and final ground for third party standing was based
upon the fact that the restriction on Tom would have deprived the third
parties whose rights Tom had invoked of their constitutional rights. In
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron38 an Ohio
abortion clinic was given standing to challenge an Ohio anti-abortion
statute on behalf of its clients because the enforcement of the statute
would have resulted in depriving those clients of their constitutional
rights. 9 In Tom, the court found that the injunction of Tom's rock
concert would have been a restriction that may have deprived his cus-
tomers of their constitutional rights to hear free expression.4 ° Thus
Tom had the right to assert the rights of those customers.
The state's argument was based on nuisance. The Ohio prosecutor
alleged that the concert promoter was subject to abatement under the
Ohio nuisance statutes.4' Ohio further alleged that it had a compelling
state interest to enforce its criminal drug laws and that injunction
should have been granted.
33. Id at 1289.
34. Tom, 428 N.E.2d at 881.
35. Id
36. 474 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
37. Id at 1008.
38. 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
39. Id at 1184.
40. 429 N.E.2d at 881.
41. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3719.10 (Baldwin 1980).
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The Tom court found that the Ohio nuisance statute merely de-
fined a nuisance, and did not prescribe the procedures to be used to
abate the nuisance.42 In order to determine the procedure for abate-
ment, the court turned to the applicable remedies statute43 and found
that the statute required some degree of culpability on the part of the
person against whom the injunction was sought.44 The court found
that since the concert promoter had employed cameras, searches and
uniformed and undercover guards to help enforce Ohio's drug laws,
and since the promoter had done so at his own expense when he had no
duty to enforce Ohio's laws on private land, that there was no showing
of culpability on the part of the promoter.
The court recognized Ohio's compelling state interest to enforce its
criminal drug laws,45 however in the present case, the court found that
its method of enforcement was in direct opposition to a legitimate exer-
cise of expression. Since the first amendment protects free expression,
an injunction against the concert was found to be an overbroad exercise
of the state's police power and was in violation of the constitution.
In conclusion, this opinion was rendered at the trial level in Ohio.
Consequently, it does not change the law in the area of first amend-
ment rights, nor should it. The decision is significant only because it
consistently applies the established standards in the area of free speech
against the laws of a state. The implication is that the Ohio judiciary is
aware and respectful of the value and importance of free speech and
expression, and is willing to uphold that value even at the expense of
police efficiency.
Daniel D. Gilson
D. Antitrust
1. Price Discrimination-Records
When the Zoslaws' record store began to go under, due to local
competition, they decided not to sink with the ship and instead filed an
antitrust action, alleging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act and
the Sherman Act.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Zoslaw v. MCA Distribut-
42. Tom, 428 N.E.2d at 882.
43. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3767.02 (Baldwin 1980).
44. 428 N.E.2d at 882.
45. Id. at 881.
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ing Corp. ,' rejected the Zoslaws' claims of conspiracy by distributors
and chain stores and monopolization by a chain store, in violation of
the Sherman Act. The court remanded the Robinson-Patman price
discrimination claim, except as to an ad agency, for a factual determi-
nation of whether records purchased by stores, following warehouse
storage in California, remained in the flow of interstate commerce.
2
From 1965-1977, Charles and Jane Zoslaw operated Main Music
Centre, a Mill Valley record store, which sold records, tapes, equip-
ment, and other related merchandise. While in business, they en-
countered financial losses due to a rapid increase of competing stores
who sold records at lower prices. The Zoslaws' eventually went out of
business in 1977, but not before filing an involved antitrust action
against numerous record distributors, including MCA Distributing
Corp., Capitol Records, Inc., Polygram Distribution, Inc., and
Warner/Electra/Atlantic Corp., (WEA), several retail record stores, in-
cluding Tower Enterprises, Inc., (MTS) and CBS, Inc., and the Doug
Robertson Advertising Agency.'
The Zoslaws' alleged that the distributors sold records and tapes to
the retail chain stores at lower prices than to independent stores, in
violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,' which prohibits price
discrimination in interstate commerce. They further alleged that the
retailers violated §§ 2(d), 2(e), and 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act by
encouraging and accepting the price discrimination.5
I. Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp., 698 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1982), affg and remand-
ing, Zoslaw v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 583 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Cal. 1980), cert.
denied, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 1777 (1983).
2. 693 F.2d 870.
3. Id at 874.
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (West 1973), provides:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodi-
ties are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . .. and
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
5. 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(d) (West 1973), provides that:
[iut shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for
payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in
the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services
or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the. . . sale,
or offering for sale of any products . . . unless such payment or consideration is
available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the
distribution of such products or commodities.
15 U.S.C.A. § 13(e) (West 1973), provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to
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The Zoslaws' also alleged that the distributors and retailers had
conspired to favor retail chain stores, in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.6 Lastly, they alleged that MTS violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act by monopolizing the retail record market.7
Between 1976-1978, the district court granted summary judgment
as to five of the distributors, as well as MTS and the Doug Robertson
Advertising Agency on the Sherman Act claims. In May 1980, the last
remaining defendant, ABC, was granted summary judgment on both
claims and the court entered a final judgment in favor of all defendants
in June 1980.8
The Zoslaws' appeal of the district court's findings is the basis for
the instant case, wherein they challenged the finding that the allegedly
discriminatory sales were not "in commerce" as required by section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Alternatively, they contended that
jurisdiction under section 2(d) and section 2(e) of the Act is applicable
to the distributors and that section 2(f) grants the court jurisdiction
over the retailers. The Zoslaws' further challenged the court's rejection
of their claims of Sherman Act violations, monopolization and failure
to deal. 9
In order for the court to have jurisdiction over the alleged Robin-
son-Patman section 2(a) violations, the plaintiffs must show that the
defendants were engaged in interstate commerce, that the price dis-
crimination occurred in the course of such commerce, and that either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in
commerce. 10
Each distributor maintained regional warehouses in California,
which supplied records to stores in the San Francisco Bay Area, includ-
ing MTS and Marin Music Centre. Depending on the distributor in-
discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a com-
modity bought for resale, .... upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally
equal terms."
15 U.S.C.A. § 13(f) (West 1973), provides that "[iut shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1973), provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States ... is declared to be illegal."
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1973), provides that "[elvery person who shall monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ..
8. 693 F.2d at 875-75.
9. Id. at 876.
10. Id at 877.
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volved, each of the warehouses received a portion of their products
from out of state. Occasionally, when a warehouse was out of a desired
produce, "drop shipments" occurred, wherein an out of state manufac-
turing plant would send the product directly to the local retailer."
The district court analyzed whether the record sales to retailers,
subsequent to storage of the product, were in the flow of commerce by
using the "intent" test.' 2 Under this test, the flow of commerce ends
when the goods reach their intended destination. 3 When determining
whether goods have reached their intended destination, courts consider
whether out of state goods are intended for a particular customer, even
if sitting in a warehouse. If so, they are still "in commerce." However,
goods that are stored in a warehouse for general inventory purposes are
no longer considered in the "stream of commerce."'
14
The district court found that the distributors stocked their Califor-
nia warehouses for general inventory purposes, and held that subse-
quent sales to retailers were not in the flow of commerce and therefore
not subject to jurisdiction under the Robinson-Patman Act.'
5
However, the circuit court disagreed with the district court's analy-
sis, noting that the "intent" analysis gives interstate producers a means
to avoid Robinson-Patman liability simply by setting up local ware-
houses in the states where the products are purchased.' 6 The court
cited a U.S. Supreme Court case which held that in-state storage of
gasoline by an interstate oil producer did not end the flow of com-
merce, thereby imposing some limits on the "intent" test.'"
The appellate court concluded that summary judgment was pre-
maturely granted on the Robinson-Patman claims as there were mate-
rial facts in dispute regarding whether the subsequent sales were in
commerce,' 8 which should be resolved by the jury on remand. How-
ever, the court agreed with the district court's finding that the "drop
shipments," considered alone, were insufficient to confer jurisdiction.II
The district court found "no factual or legal basis upon which
plaintiffs hope to hold the Doug Robertson Advertising Agency lia-
11. Id
12. Id at 877-78.
13. 4 J. Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 26.02 [3] at 26-40.1
(1983).
14. 693 F.2d at 878-79.
15. 533 F. Supp. at 550.
16. 693 F.2d at 878-79.
17. Id (citing, Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 238 (1951)).
18. 693 F.2d at 880.
19. Id
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ble."2 The ad agency was responsible for MTS' advertising and
owned 5 percent of several MTS subsidiary corporations, but was not
connected to any price discriminatory behavior and was therefore not
liable under the Robinson-Patman Act. The circuit court therefore up-
held the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the Doug
Robertson Advertising Agency.21
The appellate court began its analysis of the Zoslaws' Sherman
Act claims by noting their procedural failure to comply with Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Zoslaws had filed an unau-
thenticated and disorganized opposition to defendants motion for sum-
mary judgment which failed to "give rise to a genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to prevent a motion for summary judgment".22
Although the circuit court agreed with the district court's finding
that the Zoslaws' Sherman Act claims were without merit, it fully ex-
amined each of the two aspects of the claim: that the record distribu-
tors and chain retailers, overall, conspired to favor the chain stores over
the small stores23 and that a vertical restraint of competition existed
between each distributor and each chain store retailer.24
Since the Zoslaws' opposition motion failed to demonstrate any
direct evidence of conspiracy, they attempted to demonstrate an infer-
ence of "conscious parallelism" between distributors based upon trade
association and credit managers meetings.25 Conscious parallelism "is
admissable circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may in-
fer agreement. 26 This may help to support a finding of conspiracy, but
standing alone, is insufficient. To prove conscious parallelism, plain-
tiffs must demonstrate that defendants used similar business practices,
that these business practices were against the self interest of each con-
spirator and establish a plausible motive for the conspirator's
conduct.27
The district court found and the circuit court agreed that the Zos-
laws failed to demonstrate any of the requisite elements of conscious
parallelism.28 The Zoslaws tried to show similar business practices
among distributors by pointing to their use of similar classification of
20. 533 F. Supp. at 551.
21. 693 F.2d at 882.
22. Id. at 883.
23. Id at 884.
24. Id at 886.
25. Id at 884.
26. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
27. 693 F.2d at 884.
28. Id
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retail accounts, pricing structures and promotional schemes, but the
distributors successfully demonstrated significant variations in these
practices. The distributors were also able to justify the Zoslaws' claim
that their actions were against their own self interest by demonstrating
that legitimate good faith business decisions motivated their practices.
Lastly, the motive element was unsubstantiated, as the existence of a
conspiracy would actually have increased the bargaining power of the
chain stores. The Zoslaws could not show why it would have been in
the record distributors interest to lower prices on behalf of their largest
group of customers, the chain stores.
The Zoslaws further attempted to prove that the distributors con-
spired on the basis of credit information exchanges and trade associa-
tion meetings.29 The court held that trade meetings, without any
showing of illegal agreements, were insufficent to prove a conspiracy.3 °
Further, the exchange of credit information was permitted when used
by individual members to determine whether to exercise credit. There-
fore, since there was no indication of any agreements to fix credit
terms, the Zoslaws' conspiracy arguments were rejected by the circuit
CoUrt.
3 '
In addition, the Zoslaws alleged numerous vertical conspiracies in
the form of price discriminations between individual distributors and
retailers. They alleged that these secondary Robinson-Patman type vi-
olations also violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.32
The circuit court stated that such agreements, without proof of an
exclusionary effect, do not give rise to a section 1 claim.33 The Zoslaws
did not present any evidence of any vertical agreements to exclude
competition, but even if they had, such agreements do not violate sec-
tion 1 unless they are unreasonable.34
The reasonableness of such agreements is determined by balanc-
ing the "competitive evils of the restraint against the anticompetitive
benefits asserted on its behalf.' '35 The court concluded that there was
simply no indication that sales agreements between individual distribu-
tors and retailers constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.3 6
The Zoslaws further alleged that the retail chain store, Tower
29. Id at 885 (specifically, the Nat'l Ass'n of Record Mfrs.).
30. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 575 (1925).
31. 693 F.2d at 886.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Gough v. Rossmoor, 585 F.2d 381, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1978).
36. 698 F.2d at 887.
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Records, (MTS), attempted to monopolize the retail record and tape
market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 37 A section 2 at-
tempted monopoly must include a specific intent to control prices or
destroy competition in some part of commerce, there must be predatory
or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplishing an unlawful pur-
pose, and there must be a dangerous probability of success."
The Zoslaws presented no direct evidence of intent to monopolize,
but instead claimed that Tower Records engaged in predatory pricing
by setting record and tape prices below the Zoslaws cost of doing busi-
ness. The circuit court stated that a predatory price exists "where the
firm foregoes short-term profits in order to develop a market position
such that the firm can later raise prices and recoup profits."39
A price is not predatory if it is equal to or if it exceeds the average
variable production costs." Under this standard, the Zoslaws failed to
show that MTS priced below its own average production costs, but only
that they priced below the Zoslaws' production costs.4 '
The Zoslaws also contended that MTS engaged in predatory con-
duct by negotiating favorable sales terms with the individual distribu-
tors. The circuit court summarily disposed of this claim by stating that
such conduct does not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.42 It further stated that the Zoslaws
were unable to show any evidence of market power by MTS. In fact,
MTS operated only two retail stores in the six San Francisco Bay Area
counties which constituted a relevant market and accounted for no
more than 10 percent of the total record and tape sales in the area.43
Therefore, the Zoslaw's monopolization claim was also rejected by the
court.
The Zoslaws' final contention was that the district court incor-
rectly granted summary judgment to Capitol Records, Inc., on their
claim that Capitol refused to deal with them, in violation of section 1
37. Id
38. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1308-09 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, , U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 364 (1982).
39. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
40. P. Areeda & D. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 711 (1975).
41. 693 F.2d at 888. The plaintiff might be able to prove a predatory pricing claim
without meeting this standard if able to prove the defendant "sacrificed greater profits or
included greater losses than necessary, in order to eliminate the plaintiff." William Inglis &
Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1036 (9th Cir. 1981).
42. 693 F.2d at 888.
43. Id
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and section 2 of the Sherman Act. In June, 1975, Capitol Records, Inc.,
settled out of court with the Zoslaws and shortly thereafter, ceased sell-
ing merchandise to them. The Zoslaws then amended their complaint
to reinstate Capitol as a defendant, due to their refusal to deal.
44
The district court found no evidence that Capitol's refusal to deal
was in any way connected with the alleged horizontal and vertical con-
spiracies and that Capitol's desire to avoid litigation was a legitimate
business purpose.45 Therefore, there was no genuine issue of material
fact. The circuit court agreed that summary judgment was proper and
pointed out that in the absence of any arrangement to restrain trade, a
manufacturer's refusal to deal with a retail store because of an antitrust
suit filed against it by the store, did not constitute an unlawful purpose
in violation of the Sherman Act.4 6
Therefore, although the Zoslaws' were granted a remand as to the
procedural question of whether there was jurisdiction over their Robin-
son-Patman claims, the federal court of appeals found no merit in their
substantive claims of antitrust violations.
It was unfortunate that the Zoslaws' small retail record store was
unable to compete with the large chain stores that opened in their area,
but this fact alone was not enough to merit their antitrust action. They
could not show that the other record retailers and distributors were
conspiring to put them out of business, but only demonstrated that the
free enterprise concept of open competition was at work, albeit to their
personal detriment.
Susan Fox
44. Id at 889.
45. Id at 889-90 (citing House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867,
871 (2d Cir. 1962)).
46. 693 F.2d at 890.
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